WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Yemen

63High63 of 100, High band, 50 to 74good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

96Extreme96 of 100, Extreme band, 75 to 100

good confidence8 independent sources

Why this score (10 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

1 excluded source
  • SMEX, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-11-28: aged out after 3 years.

Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

83Extreme83 of 100, Extreme band, 75 to 100

good confidence5 independent sources

No reports were found of devices being searched, imaged or seized at this border, or of travellers being compelled to unlock them. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (5 indirect sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

1 excluded source
  • SMEX, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-11-28: aged out after 3 years.

Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

65High65 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence2 independent sources

Why this score (2 sources)
  • ITU Global Cybersecurity Index 2024, Technical pillar: 1.90 of 20.

    International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index · observed 2024-12-31

  • 紛争中のイエメンで活動する実在しない医師、軍人、国連職員等になりすまし、Facebook、X(旧Twitter)、Instagram等のSNS、LINE等のメッセージアプリを通じて親密になった後に、荷物の輸送費・日本への渡航費・契約解除金・病院への治療費等様々な名目で高額の送金を求める詐欺の手口が多数確認されています。

    Our translation: Many cases have been confirmed of a scam method in which, impersonating non-existent doctors, military personnel, UN staff and others operating in conflict-ridden Yemen, becoming intimate through social networking services such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and Instagram and messaging apps such as LINE, and then requesting large remittances under various pretexts such as transportation costs for luggage, travel expenses to Japan, contract cancellation fees and hospital treatment costs.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overseas travel safety information · observed 2026-10-16 · written for JPN nationals · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

60High60 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence9 independent sources

Why this score (17 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

2 excluded sources
  • SMEX, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-08-24: aged out after 3 years.
  • ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-11-24: aged out after 3 years.

Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

54High54 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

moderate confidence1 independent source

No law or enforcement action was found restricting the use of a VPN or strong encryption here. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (1 indirect source)
  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored YEM 1.80 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

51High51 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence5 independent sources

Why this score (7 sources)
  • Freedom House 2026 scored YEM 1 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored YEM 1.63 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored YEM 3.91 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • A security force affiliated with the Security Administration of Huraidha District arrested Kashmeem on the street after days of surveillance, a raid on his home, and the intimidation of his family—acts which appear to be in retaliation for his journalistic work and opinions he expressed on social media.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-04-18 · extracted by language model

  • These include frequent internet shutdowns, extensive surveillance of dissidents, and censorship of news and social media platforms, limiting communication with friends and family, online learning, remote work, and economic opportunities.

    Global Voices (Advox), via a site scoped search · observed 2025-03-21 · extracted by language model

  • Right to privacy, Telecommunications, Regulation of evidence collection Article 53 The state shall guarantee the freedom and confidentiality of mail, telephone, telegram and all other means of communication, none of which may be censored, searched, exposed, delayed or confiscated except in cases specified by law and according to a court order.

    Comparative Constitutions Project · observed 2026-10-16 · extracted by language model

  • No person can be put under surveillance unless in accordance with the law.

    Comparative Constitutions Project · observed 2026-10-16 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

10Low10 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence1 independent source

Why this score (1 source)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 4.4 points over 61 days, from 59.1 to 63.5. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Yemen. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 14 sources: Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; CIVICUS Monitor country updates; Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search; Comparative Constitutions Project; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab, Internet Outage Detection and Analysis; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; Global Voices (Advox), via a site scoped search; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overseas travel safety information; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.