WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Tunisia

43Caution43 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

84Extreme84 of 100, Extreme band, 75 to 100

good confidence12 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 61% of full strength.

Why this score (26 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored TUN 2 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • Freedom House 2026 scored TUN 1 of 4 on free and independent media.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored TUN 3.85 of 4 on how routinely the government censors political content on social media, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored TUN 2.04 of 4 on how often people are arrested for political content they posted online, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Tunisia - Level 2: Exercise Increased Caution; Tunisia - Level 2: Exercise Increased Caution

    US Department of State, Travel Advisories · observed 2026-05-21 · written for USA nationals

  • FCDO advice for Tunisia: avoid_all_travel_to_parts.

    UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice · observed 2026-07-24 · written for GBR nationals

  • Tunisia: Exercise a high degree of caution

    Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories · observed 2026-10-14 · written for CAN nationals

  • Tunisia (Tunesien): No travel warning in force

    Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise · observed 2026-10-06 · written for DEU nationals

  • For years, the government has flagrantly weaponized Decree Law 54 , a cybercrime law introduced by President Saied in 2022, that makes it illegal “to produce, spread, disseminate, send or write false news with the aim of infringing on the rights of others, harming public safety or national defense or sowing terror among the population.”

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2026-07-31 · extracted by language model

  • Official discourse has framed critics as corrupt elites or foreign agents, creating a climate in which legal tools—Decree 54, penal code provisions on insulting the president and conspiracy, and anti‑terrorism and money‑laundering legislation—are used to police expression and political activity.

    Nawaat, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-12-20 · extracted by language model

  • Decree 54, introduced in 2022 — a year after President Kais Saied’s power grab — has become the primary tool for suppressing critical voices in Tunisia.

    ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-11 · extracted by language model

  • The statement warns that Decree-Law 54 has become the government’s primary tool for targeting dissent, with Dahmani facing five separate cases for political commentary, three of which have already resulted in convictions.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-10 · extracted by language model

  • In October 2024, Dahmani, who is also a prominent lawyer, received a two-year sentence under Decree 54 on cybercrime on charges of spreading “false” news for commenting on the local independent radio station IFM about the mistreatment of sub-Saharan Africans in Tunisia.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-02 · extracted by language model

  • Dhamani was arrested last year after making comments during a television appearance that questioned the government’s stance on undocumented African migrants in Tunisia.

    MyJoyOnline, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-02 · extracted by language model

  • Tunisian authorities have used the cybercrime law to continue to arrest, prosecute, and silence members of the press, the letter states.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-02-12 · extracted by language model

  • Une simple opinion exprimée en ligne peut désormais exposer quiconque à des poursuites judiciaires , comme en témoignent les nombreux cas déjà recensés.

    Our translation: A simple opinion expressed online can now expose anyone to legal proceedings, as shown by the numerous cases already documented.

    Inkyfada, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-02-10 · extracted by language model

  • She was convicted on October 24 under Decree 54 on cybercrime over her comments on IFM radio about sub-Saharan Africans in Tunisia facing racism .

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-10-25 · extracted by language model

  • And indeed, since the Decree-law was issued, Tunisian authorities have opened several criminal investigations to prosecute media outlets, lawyers, and students for criticising government officials or other forms of protected speech.

    ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search · observed 2023-03-30 · extracted by language model

  • Journalist Haitham al-Makki was sentenced to one year in prison on 15th July 2026 in relation to a case brought by the Habib Bourguiba University Hospital in Sfax, following a post he published on social media concerning conditions within the hospital.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-10-01 · extracted by language model

  • Press freedom in Tunisia remains significantly restricted, with increasing use of legal measures to target journalists and limit freedom of expression.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-06-17 · extracted by language model

  • On 16th April 2026, the Second Criminal Chamber of the Sfax 1 Court of First Instance sentenced Tunisian comedian and actor Lotfi Abdelli, in absentia, to 18 months in prison in connection with a performance presented during the 2022 Sfax International Festival.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-06-17 · extracted by language model

  • While President Kais Saied continues to rely on Decree-Law 54 , which he forcefully imposed in 2021, to criminalize critical speech and prosecute journalists, authorities are now deploying a wider set of tactics to weaken independent media.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2026-05-12 · extracted by language model

  • Ambiguous expressions with legal implications, as outlined in article 226 of the Penal Code: Whosoever publicly violates moral standards or common decency through gesture or speech or intentionally disturbs others in a way which defies decency may be sanctioned with prison sentence of six months or a fine of one thousand dinars.

    Nawaat, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-12-31 · extracted by language model

  • Est puni de six mois d’emprisonnement et d’une amende de mille dinars quiconque porte publiquement atteinte aux bonnes mœurs ou à la morale publique par le geste ou la parole ou gène intentionnellement autrui d’une façon qui porte atteinte à la pudeur.

    Our translation: Anyone who publicly violates good morals or public morality by gesture or speech, or intentionally annoys another person in a way that violates decency, is punishable by six months’ imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dinars.

    Nawaat, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-11-12 · extracted by language model

  • Est puni de six mois d’emprisonnement et d’une amende de mille dinars quiconque porte publiquement atteinte aux bonnes mœurs ou à la morale publique par le geste ou la parole ou gène intentionnellement autrui d’une façon qui porte atteinte à la pudeur.

    Our translation: Anyone who publicly harms good morals or public morality by gesture or speech, or intentionally bothers another person in a way that harms modesty, is punished by six months’ imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dinars.

    Nawaat, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-10-31 · extracted by language model

  • He is being investigated under Article 86 of the telecommunications code over a post in which he criticized the judicial harassment of journalist Khalifa Guesmi , who spent over 3 years in prison.

    Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search · observed 2026-04-28 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

3 excluded sources
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-07-01: aged out after 3 years.
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search, observed 2024-01-04: aged out after 3 years.
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search, observed 2024-09-13: aged out after 2 years.

Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

44Caution44 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence5 independent sources

Why this score (6 sources)

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Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

43Caution43 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence4 independent sources

Why this score (5 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored TUN 2 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored TUN 3.20 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored TUN 3.22 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2025 scored TUN 0.26 of 1 on whether freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed, a measure built from expert assessments of warrantless interception of communications.

    World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, sub-factor 4.6 · observed 2025-01-01

  • Cameras are brought near to their faces and photos taken without explanation, as if their presence alone were a violation meriting investigation.

    Nawaat, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-10 · extracted by language model

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Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

42Caution42 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence7 independent sources

Why this score (55 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

27Caution27 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

moderate confidence2 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 66% of full strength.

No reports were found of attacks, interception or fraud aimed at visitors using networks here. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (2 indirect sources)

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Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

24Low24 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence1 independent source

Why this score (1 source)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

23Low23 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence3 independent sources

Why this score (3 sources)

  • Some restrictions. In Tunisia, the use of encryption facilities or services through public telecommunications networks is regulated by the country's Telecommunications Code. The law also regulates the importation and commercialisation of encryption systems for telecommunications networks and requires the government's approval of the commercialisation and importation of such systems. The conditions and exceptions to these general requirements for technical and administrative approval is listed in the regulation.

    Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies · observed 2019-06-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored TUN 3.59 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • OONI recorded no confirmed blocking across 2,213 measurements of anonymity and censorship circumvention tools in TUN over the 90 days to 2026-10-16, with 25 further results inconclusive.

    Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data · observed 2026-10-16

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Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 11.0 points over 61 days, from 31.7 to 42.7. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Tunisia. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 18 sources: ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search; Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; CIVICUS Monitor country updates; Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net, obstacles to access; Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab, Internet Outage Detection and Analysis; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies; Inkyfada, via a site scoped search; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; MyJoyOnline, via a site scoped search; Nawaat, via a site scoped search; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, sub-factor 4.6. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.