WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Libya

65High65 of 100, High band, 50 to 74good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

96Extreme96 of 100, Extreme band, 75 to 100

good confidence7 independent sources

Why this score (13 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored LBY 1 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • Freedom House 2026 scored LBY 0 of 4 on free and independent media.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored LBY 3.09 of 4 on how routinely the government censors political content on social media, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored LBY 0.87 of 4 on how often people are arrested for political content they posted online, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Libya - Level 4: Do Not Travel

    US Department of State, Travel Advisories · observed 2026-08-31 · written for USA nationals

  • FCDO advice for Libya: avoid_all_travel_to_parts, avoid_all_but_essential_travel_to_parts.

    UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice · observed 2026-07-21 · written for GBR nationals

  • Libya: Avoid all travel

    Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories · observed 2026-10-06 · written for CAN nationals

  • Libya (Libyen): Reisewarnung: travel warning in force

    Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise · observed 2026-08-31 · written for DEU nationals

  • You could face serious consequences, including arrest, detention and violence, if you discuss, share or publish negative information about the political situation or criticize the current authorities, including on social media.

    Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories · observed 2026-10-16 · written for CAN nationals · extracted by language model

  • You could be accused of blasphemy and sentenced to jail if you publicly criticize Islam, its teachings or values.

    Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories · observed 2026-10-16 · written for CAN nationals · extracted by language model

  • On 15th April 2025, a Tripoli court sentenced nine Libyan men, one Libyan woman, and one Pakistani man to prison terms ranging from three to 15 years on charges including “insulting Islam,” “insulting religious sanctities and rituals using the internet,” “calling for the establishment of a banned group,” and “promoting the change of the fundamental principles of the constitution.”

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2025-10-26 · extracted by language model

  • Emazzib was taken from his home after sharing a video on social media criticising security agencies and prosecution offices, while Abdulkarim was held following his participation in a satirical television programme highlighting mismanagement within the security sector.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-05-06 · extracted by language model

  • According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), although several charges — such as possession of weapons and membership in terrorist groups — have been dropped by the military prosecutor, the Zerouali, who has worked with several media outlets, including the Al Ghaïma news agency, is still being prosecuted for reporting for outlets considered hostile by the authorities.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2025-10-26 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

71High71 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence5 independent sources

No reports were found of devices being searched, imaged or seized at this border, or of travellers being compelled to unlock them. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (5 indirect sources)

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Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

69High69 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

moderate confidence1 independent source

Why this score (1 source)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

68High68 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence7 independent sources

Why this score (43 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

1 excluded source
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-09-20: aged out after 3 years.

Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

64High64 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence4 independent sources

Why this score (5 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored LBY 1 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored LBY 2.65 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored LBY 1.08 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Communications are closely monitored by the various armed groups and militias throughout Libya.

    Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories · observed 2026-10-16 · written for CAN nationals · extracted by language model

  • The law also regularises the Executive’s comprehensive, warrantless surveillance over the digital spaces and allows them to censor websites and content.

    ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search · observed 2022-11-10 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

49Caution49 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

moderate confidence2 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 66% of full strength.

No reports were found of attacks, interception or fraud aimed at visitors using networks here. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (2 indirect sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

30Caution30 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence2 independent sources

Why this score (2 sources)

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored LBY 2.23 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • OONI recorded no confirmed blocking across 4,628 measurements of anonymity and censorship circumvention tools in LBY over the 90 days to 2026-10-16, with 74 further results inconclusive.

    Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data · observed 2026-10-16

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 7.1 points over 61 days, from 57.7 to 64.8. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Libya. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 12 sources: ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search; Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; CIVICUS Monitor country updates; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net, obstacles to access; Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab, Internet Outage Detection and Analysis; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.