WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Israel

39Caution39 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

62High62 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence10 independent sources

Why this score (15 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

2 excluded sources
  • Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search, observed 2024-06-14: aged out after 2 years.
  • Global Voices (Advox), via a site scoped search, observed 2024-05-03: aged out after 2 years.

Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

56High56 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence8 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 43% of full strength.

Why this score (13 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored ISR 3 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored ISR 2.00 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored ISR 3.80 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Earlier this month, Meta announced that it had detected a new spear-phishing attempt linked to the Israeli surveillance group NSO, notoriously famous for developing the Pegasus spyware.

    SMEX, via a site scoped search · observed 2026-06-22 · extracted by language model

  • By having access to the control units of Palestinian networks, occupation forces can penetrate the Palestinian telecom and internet system, collect information, and monitor everything that flows through it, especially in times of war.

    SMEX, via a site scoped search · observed 2023-10-12 · extracted by language model

  • We identified a subset of suspected Paragon deployments, including in Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Israel, and Singapore.

    Citizen Lab feed · observed 2025-12-08 · extracted by language model

  • According to The New York Times, after the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas, Israeli intelligence officers in Unit 8200 also started to turn to the use of facial recognition technology in Gaza.

    ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-04-09 · extracted by language model

  • The system, launched in 2022, aimed at collecting and storing recordings of millions of daily phone calls by Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

    Doha News, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-08-07 · extracted by language model

  • They threatened to strip me of my nationality, to monitor me constantly, and to end my career.

    Doha News, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-15 · extracted by language model

  • We identified a subset of suspected Paragon deployments, including in Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Israel, and Singapore.

    Schneier on Security feed · observed 2025-03-25 · extracted by language model

  • The few reporters who have been permitted to enter Gaza from the outside were only able to do so under the strict surveillance of the Israeli army.

    Reporters Without Borders, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-10-03 · extracted by language model

  • Although the Unit does not disclose much of its operations, it is renowned for hacking and conducting mass surveillance in the occupied Palestinian territories.

    SMEX, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-08-12 · extracted by language model

  • According to Visualizing Palestine, the Israeli occupation is also known for engaging in “spyware diplomacy,” supplying offensive cyber tech as a bargaining chip to promote normalization in countries like Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

    SMEX, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-05-07 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

55High55 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence5 independent sources

Why this score (7 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

42Caution42 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence9 independent sources

Why this score (19 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

3 excluded sources
  • SMEX, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-10-12: aged out after 3 years.
  • Reporters Without Borders, via a site scoped search, observed 2024-10-03: aged out after 2 years.
  • Doha News, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-11-15: aged out after 3 years.

Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

22Low22 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence3 independent sources

Why this score (3 sources)

  • Some restrictions. In Israel, organisations and individuals are prohibited from engaging in encryption-related items, including importing or exporting them unless they have a licence to do so from the Director-General at the Ministry of Defence.

    Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies · observed 2019-06-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored ISR 3.80 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • OONI recorded no confirmed blocking across 17,137 measurements of anonymity and censorship circumvention tools in ISR over the 90 days to 2026-10-16, with 252 further results inconclusive.

    Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data · observed 2026-10-16

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

18Low18 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence2 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 66% of full strength.

Why this score (2 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

3 excluded sources
  • The Record feed, observed 2023-12-29: aged out after 3 years.
  • Kaspersky Securelist feed, observed 2023-10-16: aged out after 3 years.
  • Index on Censorship, via a site scoped search, observed 2023-11-01: aged out after 3 years.

Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

14Low14 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence2 independent sources

Why this score (2 sources)

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored ISR 3.80 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • ولم يجب في رده بشكل واضح عن السؤال حول وجود ضمانات لعدم استغلال إسرائيل هذه البيانات.

    Our translation: In his response, he did not clearly answer the question about whether guarantees existed to prevent Israel from exploiting this data.

    Daraj, via a site scoped search · observed 2024-10-30 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 9.5 points over 61 days, from 30 to 39.5. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Israel. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 21 sources: ARTICLE 19, via a site scoped search; Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; Balkan Insight (BIRN), via a site scoped search; Citizen Lab feed; Committee to Protect Journalists, via a site scoped search; Daraj, via a site scoped search; Doha News, via a site scoped search; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab, Internet Outage Detection and Analysis; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies; Index on Censorship, via a site scoped search; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; Notes from Poland, via a site scoped search; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; Reporters Without Borders, via a site scoped search; Schneier on Security feed; SMEX, via a site scoped search; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.