WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Chile

24Low24 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

34Caution34 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

moderate confidence2 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 63% of full strength.

Why this score (2 sources)

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHL 3.67 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Así, en el caso de Chile, los correos electrónicos han sido asimilados al correo postal tradicional para efectos de su incautación, generando distorsiones preocupantes, como que dicha medida sea aplicada sobre los servidores o los equipos completos, bajo escasos resguardos procedimentales o en desproporción respecto de la demás información contenida en ellos.

    Our translation: Thus, in the case of Chile, emails have been treated like traditional postal mail for the purposes of their seizure, generating worrying distortions, such as that this measure is applied to servers or entire devices, with few procedural safeguards or disproportionately in relation to the other information contained in them.

    Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-23 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

32Caution32 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence5 independent sources

Why this score (8 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored CHL 4 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHL 3.38 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHL 3.67 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2025 scored CHL 0.84 of 1 on whether freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed, a measure built from expert assessments of warrantless interception of communications.

    World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, sub-factor 4.6 · observed 2025-01-01

  • Tras la detención, se explicó que la principal prueba incriminatoria fue una serie de conversaciones de WhatsApp y Telegram, obtenidas a través de la interceptación de las aplicaciones de mensajería.

    Our translation: After the arrests, it was explained that the main incriminating evidence was a series of WhatsApp and Telegram conversations, obtained through the interception of the messaging applications.

    Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-23 · extracted by language model

  • Así, en el caso de Chile, los correos electrónicos han sido asimilados al correo postal tradicional para efectos de su incautación, generando distorsiones preocupantes, como que dicha medida sea aplicada sobre los servidores o los equipos completos, bajo escasos resguardos procedimentales o en desproporción respecto de la demás información contenida en ellos.

    Our translation: Thus, in the case of Chile, emails have been treated like traditional postal mail for the purposes of their seizure, generating worrying distortions, such as that this measure is applied to servers or entire devices, with few procedural safeguards or disproportionately in relation to the other information contained in them.

    Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-23 · extracted by language model

  • La nueva normativa pretende modificar la obligación que tienen las compañías de retener los datos de las comunicaciones que se realizan en Chile, extendiendo el período de almacenaje de uno a dos años.

    Our translation: The new regulation intends to modify the obligation companies have to retain data on communications made in Chile, extending the storage period from one to two years.

    Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-23 · extracted by language model

  • On 27th August 2025, the 4th Guarantee Court of Santiago rejected a request by Paulina Díaz Obilinovic, head prosecutor of the High Complexity Unit of the Western Metropolitan Prosecutor’s Office, to access confidential communications data belonging to 11 journalists from five media outlets.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2025-11-15 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

1 excluded source
  • Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search, observed 2019-07-01: aged out after 7 years.

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

31Caution31 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence6 independent sources

Why this score (9 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

26Caution26 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

good confidence7 independent sources

Why this score (23 sources)

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Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

21Low21 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence3 independent sources

Why this score (3 sources)

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHL 3.53 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • OONI recorded no confirmed blocking across 27,033 measurements of anonymity and censorship circumvention tools in CHL over the 90 days to 2026-10-16, with 398 further results inconclusive.

    Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data · observed 2026-10-16

  • El decreto además cuenta con un artículo que prohíbe a las compañías de telecomunicaciones la implementación de cualquier tipo de tecnología que pudiese entorpecer la entrega de esta información, lo que puede implicar un obstáculo importante para la implementación del cifrado de las comunicaciones.

    Our translation: The decree also contains an article that prohibits telecommunications companies from implementing any type of technology that could hinder the delivery of this information, which may represent a significant obstacle to implementing communications encryption.

    Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search · observed 2025-07-23 · extracted by language model

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Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

18Low18 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence5 independent sources

No reports were found of devices being searched, imaged or seized at this border, or of travellers being compelled to unlock them. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (5 indirect sources)

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Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

17Low17 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence2 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 66% of full strength.

No reports were found of attacks, interception or fraud aimed at visitors using networks here. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (2 indirect sources)

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Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 5.8 points over 61 days, from 19.1 to 24.9. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Chile. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 13 sources: Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; CIVICUS Monitor country updates; Derechos Digitales, via a site scoped search; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net, obstacles to access; Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab, Internet Outage Detection and Analysis; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, sub-factor 4.6. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.