WorldRisk

Which passport do you hold?

Risk to a traveller depends on their nationality. A country that sanctions your destination, or is sanctioned by it, changes how you are treated on arrival. Choosing here adjusts every score on the site.

We hold travel advice written for four nationalities so far. Selecting anything else shows the neutral baseline, and every page says so where it applies rather than presenting it as an assessment made for you.

Kept in your browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere, and you can change it at any time from the header.

All countries

Switzerland

25Caution25 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49good confidence(7/7 dimensions)
What this score means
Extreme75 to 100
Severe and systematic. Device search, interception and detention over online activity are documented rather than theoretical. Reconsider what you carry and what you say.
High50 to 74
Substantial and consistently evidenced measures. Device inspection, monitored networks or restricted services should be expected rather than treated as unlikely.
Caution25 to 49
Some risk, and manageable with precautions. Measures are evidenced but are narrow, inconsistently applied, or the picture is mixed.
Low0 to 24
Ordinary precautions. No systematic device search, network restriction or prosecution of visitors for online speech is evidenced.

Government travel advice is written for one citizenry, so the same country carries a different assessment depending on your passport. Change it in the header.

Showing the baseline, which weights every issuer equally. No government in our corpus publishes travel advice written for you, so this is not addressed to you specifically.

Dimensions

Each dimension is scored independently, because the traveller who cares about legal exposure for what they have posted is often not the one carrying client data. Higher means more risk.

Network threat

How hostile is the network environment to a foreign visitor, from state actors and criminals alike?

54High54 of 100, High band, 50 to 74

good confidence4 independent sources

Why this score (4 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

1 excluded source
  • The Record feed, observed 2023-12-13: aged out after 3 years.

Encryption and VPN legality

Are VPNs and strong encryption lawful, and can I be required to install an application or hand over keys?

27Caution27 of 100, Caution band, 25 to 49

moderate confidence3 independent sourcesEvidence is ageing: contributing sources are weighted at 60% of full strength.

Why this score (3 sources)

  • Some restrictions. There is currently no legislation in Switzerland regarding the general right to encryption, nor regulations on the strength of encryption technology, its licensing, or sale. However, Swiss law requires that providers of telecommunications services supply both the content and metadata of communications of the person under surveillance They must also provide the information required to carry out the surveillance, grant immediate access to facilities, and remove any encryption they have applied.

    Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies · observed 2019-06-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHE 3.94 of 4 on whether the government regulates the internet in a way consistent with international human rights standards, where higher is freer. This does not establish whether encryption or VPN use is lawful. It measures internet regulation in general, and is used as indirect evidence because the only survey that reads encryption law directly was published in 2019.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • Article 50a of the proposed legislation would also have required providers to remove encryption they had applied to user data before handing it over to Swiss authorities.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-10-14 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Surveillance and interception

How comprehensively are communications intercepted, retained, and monitored, and is commercial spyware in use?

18Low18 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence3 independent sources

Why this score (6 sources)

  • Freedom House 2026 scored CHE 4 of 4 on freedom to express personal views on sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution.

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World · observed 2026-01-01

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHE 3.73 of 4 on how comprehensively the government monitors social media and private online communication, where higher is freer.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • V-Dem Digital Society Project 2025 scored CHE 3.94 of 4 on how far privacy protection law shields communications from government access, where higher is freer. This measures what privacy law permits rather than what monitoring is practised, so it is read here as a constraint on interception rather than a measurement of it.

    V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project · observed 2025-12-31

  • The proposed changes would give the FIS/SRC additional resources and expand its surveillance powers, including against “violent extremism”, increase its access to financial data and broaden its mandate to encompass all of “cyberspace”.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-10-14 · extracted by language model

  • On 25th March 2026, Switzerland’s Federal Court ruled that part of the mass telephone surveillance of four climate activists prosecuted for painting unauthorised cycle lanes was illegal, finding that collecting their telephone data months after the events violated the principle of proportionality.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-10-14 · extracted by language model

  • In 2026, key developments included the vast expansion of surveillance powers through major revision of the Intelligence Service Act (LRens) in spite of warnings from rights groups about threats to fundamental rights.

    CIVICUS Monitor country updates · observed 2026-10-14 · extracted by language model

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Border device risk

How likely is my device to be searched, imaged, or seized at the border, and can I be compelled to unlock it?

10Low10 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence5 independent sources

No reports were found of devices being searched, imaged or seized at this border, or of travellers being compelled to unlock them. The score below is drawn from general indicators for this country rather than from anything observed about this risk, so it describes an absence of reports rather than evidence that the risk is absent.

What the score rests on (5 indirect sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Connectivity continuity

How likely am I to lose access to the internet, or to the specific tools I depend on?

10Low10 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence6 independent sources

Why this score (7 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Speech and legal exposure

What legal risk attaches to what I have said online, or say while I am there?

9Low9 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

good confidence7 independent sources

Why this score (9 sources)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Data jurisdiction

What happens to corporate or client data I carry into the jurisdiction?

9Low9 of 100, Low band, 0 to 24

moderate confidence1 independent source

Why this score (1 source)

Report an inaccuracy (corrections need a link to the reporting, statute or research that shows it).

Trend

02550751002026-08-162026-10-16

The overall score is up 6.6 points over 61 days, from 12.1 to 18.7. Most movement is the event overlay decaying rather than anything happening: a news signal loses half its weight every three weeks, so a score drifts back toward its structural baseline on its own. A step that holds is the one worth reading.

Check this yourself

These are not inputs to the score for Switzerland. They are where to look if you want to test what is above against something we did not use.

Sources

This assessment draws on 12 sources: Auswärtiges Amt, Reise- und Sicherheitshinweise; CIVICUS Monitor country updates; Freedom House, Freedom in the World; Global Affairs Canada, Travel advice and advisories; Global Partners Digital, World Map of Encryption Laws and Policies; International Telecommunication Union, Global Cybersecurity Index; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overseas travel safety information; Open Observatory of Network Interference, OONI measurement data; The Royal Gazette (Bermuda), via a site scoped search; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Foreign travel advice; US Department of State, Travel Advisories; V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Digital Society Project. Every contributing claim is quoted with its origin and date above. Model version 0.12.0, computed 2026-10-16.

If something here is wrong, say so. Corrections are handled in public, and we correct because the evidence is wrong, not because someone objects.